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The process of selling a state-owned company
in former centrally planned economies (CPEs)
differs greatly from that of buying a private
company in western market economies. While
a private seller is normally interested in selling
his portfolio expensively, a privatizing agency
in CPEs has additional goals: she intends to
ensure, e.g., that the purchaser continues the
company, makes certain investments or main-
tains a certain number of jobs. Consequently,
these concerns are a potential source of con-
flict.
This paper gives an overview of how the Ger-
man Treuhandanstalt (THA) copes with the
problem. It investigates
o first what the THA has done in establish-
ing a contractual framework reflecting her
social goals and
• second how effective this framework has
been in realizing them.
The results are mixed: the THA has been very
successful in putting an investor on the chain.
However, she has invested a lot of money.
Time must tell whether the results make all
these efforts worthwhile.I Introduction
1
Joint ventures (JV) between domestic and foreign corporations are considered as a key ele-
ment for a successful economic transformation of the formerly centrally planned economies
(CPEs) into market economies. Massive inflow of fixed capital, technologies and managerial
skills over many years to come is regarded as essential for overcoming the transformation
crisis. y
JV are, nevertheless, a hotly and controversially debated issue in CPEs. The opposition stems
not only from those who reject foreign capital penetration for ideological reasons still think-
ing in terms of Marxist theories and regard JV as an instrument of neo-colonialism designed
for political and economic exploitation. It is also often provoked by vested interests of gov-
ernments, business and trade unions in the CPEs. These interests, e.g. in respect to product
profile, investment strategy or wage and employment policy often differ widely from the in-
tentions of a foreign investor. Finally, it comes from many citizens who are also afraid that
foreign investors will steal the property which belongs to the people.
Although governments and companies in the CPEs do the best they can to realize their goals,
the results often look disappointing. The market for JV is, by far, no seller market Foreign
investors, well assisted by experienced investment bankers and attorneys, understand their
job. They put money into a business only if it promises to become a success. They spare no
effort to fix a contract which is in their own interest
In a JV the foreign investor is mostly the party which sets the tone, frequently he is even the
majority shareholder. Then he is able to revise a contract sooner or later. Sometimes he would
not dream of holding what he initially promised. The most spectacular case is perhaps the de-
cision of Volkswagen to cut the investment budget for Skoda substantially. Volkswagen may
have had good arguments in its defence: the world markets for automotive products have be-
come depressed and under those circumstances it would not make sense to enlarge capacities.
Nevertheless, the decision has been disastrous. The Czech government, the press and the
people on the streets have demonstrated deep dissatisfaction. The government has been accus-
ed of having poorly negotiated the deal.
In normal business this is not even worth talking about. There exists an acquisition contract
concluded between the seller and the purchaser. The contract, mostly elaborated by versed
1 The paper was presented at the ACE-Workshop "Joint Ventures in Transformation Countries in the
Context of Overall Investment Strategies of Their Partners" in Budapest on 10 -12 June 1994. I
am indebted to my colleagues Birgit Sander and Uwe Siegmund and Hans-ftirg Schaal (Treuhand-
anstalt) for valuable assistance and comments.attorneys, is litigable. And the purchaser will hold what he has promised. He will not dare to
be threatened permanently with litigations. He will clarify the essentials of the contract before
it is signed. However, the process of buying a company in the CPEs differs greatly from that
of buying a private company in western market economies. It means to deal not only with a
state-owned company but also with a government or a privatization agency, an omnipotent
superseller, whose motives are often quite different from those of a private seller. While a pri-
vate seller is normally interested in selling his portfolio expensively and in putting himself
out of business and responsibility as soon as possible, a government or a privatization agency
has her own goals. She has not (or not only) an interest "to take the money and run" (Dodds
and WSchter, 1993). She looks additionally that her social goals are reached: she intends to
ensure, e.g., that the purchaser will continue the company, make a certain investment or
maintain a certain number of jobs - although the companies are often heavily overstaffed.
2
These concerns are basically alien to a private investors. Consequently, they are a potential
source for conflicts.
The purpose of the paper is to give an overview of how the German Treuhandanstalt (THA)
copes with the problem. Altogether, the THA has now more than 30 000 investors under con-
tract. She is actually in the process of installing a contract management and controlling. For
years on end a special agency (with a permanent staff of about 500 lawyers, accountants and
consultants) will act as a watch-guard that the contracts are fulfilled.























The paper is written in particular for businessmen and policy makers in CPEs who may learn
from the THA's experiences. The THA is the leader in the privatization process. She is com-
pleting her job with remarkable speed. Within 3 Vi years she has privatized about 6 500 com-
plete enterprises and 7 000 parts of enterprises. Foreign investors acquired 800 (or 6 p.c.) of
"What is important to the government in dealing with these foreign companies, first and foremost,
is employment.... we constantly are told that many of these factories have 20 % overemployment,
but we are not letting the foreign buyers or investors to fire these people ... we are demanding that
they keep the people employed" (Bakal, 1992).3
them; their shares in promised investment and employment were even higher, reaching
11 p.c. and 10. p.c. respectively (Sander, 1992; Table 1).
II Privatization Strategy
1 THA Contracts
The assignment of the THA is to transfer as many as possible of the former GDR state-run
companies into private ownership. That does not mean that the THA is willing to sell to eve-
rybody who offers a reasonable price. Her ultimate goal is to create the groundwork for heal-
thy, competitive companies able to survive in the market. Consequently, an investor who is
interested in acquiring a THA-company has to present a business plan (Unternehmenskon-
zept). This plan must provide detailed information on
• the whole scale of business activities (e.g. research and development, production and
sales, technology, marketing, administration, management),
• the revenue situation (e.g. turnover and structure of sales, orders on hand, market share),
• the cost position (e.g. material, wage and overhead costs, staffing plan),
• the financial budget (e.g. cash flow, investments, depreciations) and
• the intentions for restructuring and privatization (Vogelsang, 1992; Annex 1).
The business plan and its assessment by the THA are the basis for negotiations. Without the
potential investor presenting a convincing concept the THA does not enter any dialogue. The
THA investigates first what the investor can offer in terms of operating the enterprise suc-
cessfully: is he able to overlook the market situation? Are his products competitive? Is he suf-
ficiently experienced to undertake research work? The business plan serves as the yardstick
for assessing all these issues.
With the business plan being the A and O the negotiations between the THA and the potential
investors are often lengthy and complicated. In contrast to normal acquisition contracts the
crucial matter is generally not the selling price: the THA is an institution with "deep pockets".
She does not need to maximize revenues, she can afford to make losses and sell companies
even at negative prices. Bidders are always requested to present a business plan which takes
into account the THA's social goals. According to the advice of two insiders bidders should
behave accordingly: "Check the merchandise thoroughly, push hard on the few points that
matter and aim for the quickest closing possible, before getting leap-frogged by someone who
knows the ropes and accept the process for what it is. There are terrific bargains to be had,but they do not come with ribbons and bows .... Make an offer degree of comfort as of the
deadline and if that fails, move quickly onto the next deal, using what was learned in the last
one" (Dodds and Wachter, 1993, p. 10).
Though the negotiations may be time consuming and uncomfortable, THA's acquisition con-
tracts are considered as lean by international standards. The contracts comprise only those is-
sues which really mattervclauses regarding the continuation of the company, investment and
employment guaranties, revaluation of assets, restitutional claims and other risks - and the
purchase price. Most of these clauses are not customary in normal acquisition contracts.
2 Parallel Contracts
The THA is the legal owner of her companies. Although she is not a holding company, she
takes responsibility for them. She has the exclusive right of sale. The companies are not al-
lowed to negotiate with potential investors on their own. Insofar, the case of parallel contracts
should not exist.
A temporary problem, however, have been preliminary contracts concluded between compa-
nies and investors in the early stage of the THA. At that time things were often topsy-turvy.
Immediately after the fall of the Berlin wall a large number of eastern German companies
were "occupied" by western investors by "co-operation or partnership agreements". The large
Interhotel group, a holding of more than thirty first-class hotels, e.g., was sold by its former
top manager to a western German hotel group obviously for a song. In nearly all cases the




The THA plays a key role in the process of rebuilding the eastern German economy. There-
fore, she must be interested in high investments to be undertaken there. For the THA invest-
ments are "an anchor cast into the future" (Dodds and Wachter, 1993, p. 15). They give rise
to hope that a company will be able to survive.
Before negotiations are started the potential investor has to present an investment plan. The
THA carefully scrutinizes all proposed details. "The potential investor is asked how large the
company is to become and whether production will take place at one or several locations ...
The potential investor must state the volume of investments envisaged and the time in whichthese are implemented. Assurances have to be given on both figures and the date." (Rexrodt,
1992).
The intention of negotiating-ioyestment clauses is twofold:
• First, they should assure that fresh money flows into the company and
• second, they should assign an adequate share in the risk to the investor (Kiipper, 1993).
Indeed, one can assume that an investor who risks his own money will be interested in a
positive rate of return. .
Investment clauses may have different forms: normally, only the amount of investment and
the time horizon are fixed. In other respects, however, they may be defined widely or nar-
rowly:
• In the wide definition an investor may be able to determine the specific types of invests
ments and their timing on this own.
• In the narrow definition most of the details of the procedure (types of investment, timing
and financing) are fixed.
In order to promote enforcement of the contract sanction clauses are agreed upon: if the
promised investment is not made, a penalty, often equal to one third of the contracted invest-
ment volume, has to be paid.
Until the end of 1993 the volume of promised investment contained in sales contracts had
been totalling 150 bill. DM (Table 1), however, the THA hopes that in the end she can mobi-
lize even more.
2 Employment
Given the high rate of structural unemployment the THA must be very interested in maintain-
ing or creating jobs. But as the companies to be privatized have been heavily overstaffed,
trimming down workforce numbers is the first step in privatizing them. This is normally a
source of conflicts.
It should be mentioned that an investor is not free in scaling down workforce numbers. The
German Labour Law establishes important obstacles which intend to protect workers in sev-
eral ways. Individual and collective employment protection is a complicated matter and can-
not be described here in detail (for a comprehensive description see Bayerreuther, 1992). For
some groups of persons dismissals are not possible at all (e.g. for disabled persons, persons inmilitary services, persons working on a work council), for others it is possible only after of-
ficial authorization which is often difficult to obtain. This makes it easier for the THA to se-
cure a maximum of jobs, but it makes it often difficult to sell a company properly.
As in the case of investment clauses the THA tries to fix a certain number of jobs for a certain
period of time. Normally, a stepwise reduction of jobs, sometimes also an increase, is agreed.
In principle, the number of jobsJs negotiable but, in fact, the THA is interested in maximiz-
ing them. In negotiations the THA normally starts with a certain target which is mostly out of
reach for the prospective investor. If this actually is the case, the purchaser price will be in-
creased. For the THA exists a trade-off between the number of jobs to be maintained and the
purchase price to be agreed.
Normally, the number of job guarantees is strictly fixed. As in the case of investment plans
investors have to pay a penalty if they fail to fulfill the contract. The penalty should be an
equivalent for keeping an employee on staff for the agreed time, but in fact it is lower:
24 000 DM on the average (Kiipper, 1993). Sometimes it may be cheaper for an investor to
pay the penalty.
For the THA it is important to establish clear-cut provisions in the contracts. "Investors will
normally make little progress when they try to build up loopholes into employment clauses by
inserting broad 'conditions beyond the purchaser's control' language. The Treuhand generally
expects that the penalties for failure to maintain agreed employment levels will be paid re-
gardless of the reasons for the failure. Especially unwelcome will be buyer-proposed lan-
guage which attempts to make unexpected market conditions a trigger to escape. The world of
market risks is, after all, the jungle in which entrepreneurs make their gains" (Dodds and
Wa'chter, 1993, p. 14).
Until the end of 1993 a total of 1.6 mill, jobs had been agreed (Table 1). According to the
THA the majority of investors even surpassed the targets; however, a significant minority
also fell short of them.
3 Business Continuation
A crucial matter in the negotiation process is to enforce an investor's commitment with regard
to keep the company running. The THA has an outstanding interest in the company's con-
tinuation. "The trauma to be avoided is the destruction of a company by a purchaser who
wants to tear out the surplus value lying within ..." (Dodds and Wachter, 1993, p. 12). In cer-
tain cases, if a company is obviously more worth dead than alive, the THA tries to contract
business continuation clauses. The investor has to pay a penalty - possibly decreasing in
stages for a certain period, say five years - if he fails. However, it goes without saying that theTHA has to work hard to negotiate such clauses which are absolutely unusual in normal ac-
quisition contracts.
4 Speculation and "Asset Stripping"
Anti-speculation clauses overlap with business continuation clauses. They should avoid that
an investor purchases a company for speculative reasons. Frequently, a potential investor may
only be interested in real estate as a company's only valuable asset. He may intend to shut
down the plant and resale estate and premises.
3 In the case of any resale, leasing or use con-
trary to the contract within a certain period of time a revaluation takes place. This period can
be long, sometimes much longer than in normal contracts. In the region of Berlin, a fast-
booming place where the market for real estate is a seller market, e.g., it can reach 10 years.
In extreme cases the investor has to concede to the THA an option for repurchasing
(Vorkaufsrecht) which makes it impossible for him to realize the gains. Speculation profits
have to be paid up to 100 p.c. to the THA.
Speculation clauses must not be confused with revaluation clauses. The first ones are an inte-
gral part of all contracts, the second ones can be found only in about two fifths of them.
4 Re-
valuation clauses should prevent big "windfall profits" due to unforeseeable developments in
the real estate market: this market is still unbalanced in eastern Germany and, frequently, the
true value of an object cannot be calculated. In contrast to speculation clauses revaluation
clauses are devices to share the gains between the investor and the THA. The crucial problem
with revaluation profits is that they are often only in the books. Sharing them is often the only
solution because a full repay to the THA could take away too much liquidity from the com-
pany.
However, the criteria for distinguishing between speculation and revaluation gains are vague.
"Purchasers seek to have 'speculation' defined narrowly enough so that the revaluation right
of the THA may only be invoked where there is a clear failure to fulfil the contract purpose.
The Treuhand seeks to define 'speculation' broadly enough to provide it.... with real protec-
tions against clever evasion" (Dodds and Wachter, 1993, p. 13). In practise, such clauses are
difficult to handle. Recently, the THA has negotiated more and more contracts without them.
3 Normally, the THA does not sell the real estate not necessary for operating the company. By this,
she considerably discourages speculation
4 The share was higher in earlier contracts, e.g. 54 p.c. in the 1st half year 1991 in contrast to 28 p.c.
in the 2nd half year 1992.5 Restitutional Claims
One has to keep in mind that frequently investors are objectively handicapped in fulfilling
their commitment. Such a handicap are restitution claims arising from the peculiarities of the
Unification Act. The normal legal position is "restitution before compensation" - and this has
proved to be ah immense obstacle to investments. Nobody can hope that an investor puts mo-
ney into a business before restitutional claims are cleared up.
There are different methods to lift the ban on sale. Normally, a piece of property can only be
sold by theJTHA if the local property office (Vermogensamt) has signalled that no restitu-
tional claims are announced. Otherwise the THA must obtain a so-called Investment Prefer-
ence Decision (Investitionsvorrangentscheidung) which may set aside the ban on sales. How-
ever, restitutional claims legally give the right to protest such a decision in the courts. This
can postpone investments for some years.
In order to reduce uncertainty for investors the THA offers a special restitution clause which
takes effect if a restitution claim succeeds after the property transfer has been completed. In
this case the THA is willing to repay the investor the current book value of the property re-
claimed or - if it is lower than the initial purchase price - to void the contract. A precondition
is that the investor has carried out his investment promises.
6 Ecological Damage
The typical THA contract will include some other "safe harbour clauses" which reduce the
risk for an investor - and may encourage him to pursue the THA's social goals. The most im-
portant are perhaps ecological damage clauses. These clauses release investors - partly - from
clean-up responsibilities. Often they are used to encumber the investor with a fixed amount of
the cleaning-up costs; the exceeding amount is shared between the investor and the THA up
to a certain limit and the remainder is paid by the THA alone (Ktipper, 1993). It should be
added that the environmental clauses do not allow for a "luxury clean-up". The THA must be
interested in avoiding unjustifiable expansions which may cost a lot of her money.
7 Other Safe Harbour Clauses
The THA is willing to contract "safe harbour clauses" for other unknown risks. The balance
sheet of the former GDR companies frequently contains hidden liabilities which may only be-
come known after years. But normally the THA does not insure a purchaser of a company
against usual business risks. She expects that he will do his best to win the battle. Only inspecial cases she is willing to share the risk by paying the losses of running the company for a
limited period of time.
8 Purchase Price
Finally, the standard contract with the THA includes that a purchaser has to pay,the agreed
price without delay. After signing the contract it is rather pointless to ask for easy terms or a
moratorium. In order to reduce the risk of the THA the purchaser has to bring by the guaran-
tee of a well reputed bank. For outstanding payments, also for contracted payments in instal-
ments, market interests are charged. In case of inability to pay an immediate execution of the
whole property of the purchaser can be initiated.
IV Contract Management and Controlling
No doubt, the THA has been very innovative in establishing a contractual framework reflect-
ing her social goals. But the question arises how effective this framework has been in realiz-
ing them. It is always an open question how many investors will be willing or able to stick to
what they promised. At present it is too early for a final judgement. The period of validity of
the contracts is often several years. This means that the investors are free with respect to tim-
ing: they may find it useful to fulfil their obligations immediately or they may prefer to do so
later. According to the THA's statistics the overwhelming majority of investors is fully in line
with their contracts. But a significant minority is obviously falling behind and asking for re-
vision. The acid test will already come in the near future - when more and more investors
must recognize that the avenue adopted has not led them to their goal.
The THA intends to close down her privatization shop at the end of 1994, but that does not
yet mean the definite closure. She is now forced to open up some other shops. She is building
up, inter alia, a so-called contract management and controlling. She has recognized that she
must take care of "her" companies for a long time, even after their privatization has been
concluded. And she has to ensure that the contracts are kept
1 Aims and Means
The THA's contract management and controlling has three main aims:
First, registering all contracts in a specific computer-aided system,
second, examining the fulfilment of the contracts and, if necessary, imposing penalties
and.10
third, revising or cancelling those contracts getting in serious difficulties.
An adequate registering is conditional for efficient controlling, and a permanent controlling,
on the other hand, is conditional for efficient contract management. Initially, the THA regard-
ed the registration and examination as her most important task. Now she has realized that it is
necessary to focus on the field of the contract management because a large number of con-
tracts are potential candidates for re-negotiations. Consequently, she has learnt to consider the
task of contract management in a broader sense: as a permanent evaluation of the risks in-
volved in the contracts. The THA will make sure that an investor is able to fulfil the clauses
of the contract. By this, she minimizes her own risks, too.
In the case of an infringement the THA can bring a charge against the investor, but normally
she hesitates to bring up her big guns. Only if worst comes to worst she is willing to take a
defaulting investor to court. The THA's main concern is a healthy future of the company.
This is not promoted if the investor is condemned to pay a fine - and, as a consequence, the
company goes bankrupt. One of the spectacular cases is that of the MSrkische Faser AG, one
of the largest producers of synthetic fibre in the GDR. The company was sold to a Swiss in-
vestor who presented a business concept which was obviously convincing. This concept was
mainly based on delivery contracts with an Ukrainian customer. But the customer got in seri-
ous trouble and from one day to another the MSrkische Faser lost its main market Conse-
quently, the new owner has asked for re-negotiations in order to give back the company. The
THA has rejected this demand; she is afraid to establish a precedent. On the other hand, she is
pressurised by the government of the Land Brandenburg because the company is the only
main employer in the region. Until now the case has been unresolved. The MSrkische
Faser AG is still in the ownership of the Alcor Chemie AG. But the Swiss company and the
THA are negotiating with the Rostextil, a group of 300 Russian textile producing companies
which is obviously interested in buying the shares.
But there are not only investors in difficulties which do not keep their promises. Sometimes
financially healthy investors do so, too. Another spectacular example is the deal between the
THA and a consortium of the French oil multinational Elf Aquitaine and the German com-
mercial house Thyssen Handelsunion. The consortium was very keen on buying the Minol
company which in the GDR was the only supplier of gasoline with a network of 670 stations.
However, the price for the stations demanded by the THA was high: the consortium was com-
mitted to build up a new refinery in Leuna with a guaranteed investment of 3.6 bill. DM. The
refinery should be the nucleus for revitalizing a whole region which is traditionally a center
of the German chemical industry. Meanwhile, Elf Aquitaine changed its mind. The European
oil producing industry suffers from excess capacities and it is very doubtful whether a new re-
finery could be profitable enough: it is obviously cheaper to carry finished products to Leuna11
instead of crude oil for processing there. First of all, the strategy of the THA was to force Elf
Aquitaine to keep the refinery contract - by threatening to cancel the contracts concerning the
profitable gasoline stations. In this case Elf Aquitaine had to fear that the stations would be
newly divided among its competitors. In addition, the THA could have prosecuted the compa-
ny; it is said that a penalty of 1.6 bill. DM has been contracted. This, however, could have
easily caused political quarrels which are not in the interest of the governments in Bonn and
Paris.
5
Meanwhile a new arrangement has been negotiated with the following results: Elf Aquitaine
will reduce its share in the refinery project by 24 p.c. from 67 p.c. to 43 p.c. The 24 p.c. will
be sold to Rosneft - a large Russian holding company in the oil industry. Rosneft will pay the
shares by oil supply. Thyssen Handelsunion which holds a share of 33 p.c. (with an option to
sell it to Elf Aquitaine in 1997) will then sell it to Buna GmbH. The Buna GmbH, which is
owned mainly by the THA and partially by Thyssen and Gazprom (Russia), will get in return
one third of the profitable Minol gasoline network. By this the THA hopes to raise Buna's
chance to become fully privatized.
2 Results
In examining the THA's contract management one has to call to mind that a clever investor is
always able to shape the contract in his favour. The THA does not sell enterprises but, in fact,
buys investors (Schmidt, 1993). As mentioned above, this leads to a complicated negotiation
process which is unlike any other. The THA has "deep pockets". She is able to grant price
concessions for investments and employment guaranties. Insofar it does not seem too risky to
commit oneself to an issue - if the bill has been paid in advance.
a) Performance
Meanwhile the THA has started examining the contracts. "The first results", so a spokesman
of the THA, "give grounds for optimism" (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 8,
1994): in 1993 about 2 800 of 10 000 contracts which have been in the sample were exam-
ined. 7 600 are still in examination. In 2 200 (78.8 p.c.) cases the employment targets were
realized or even surpassed. 152 000 jobs were maintained or created instead of 110 000 which
Ironically enough, Elf Aquitaine is still a state-owned company and the French government is pre-
paring its privatization. Obviously, the government will not overburden the new owners with re-
sponsibility for a doubtful investment.12
were guaranteed. But 600 investors failed their targets significantly: they provided only two
thirds of the jobs they promised (Table 2).










Targets | Realization (p.c.)
157 621 157 371 (99.8)
109 524 141881 (129.5)
48 097 15 490 (32.2)
Source: THA.
At present no data on realized or failed investment guaranties are available because the dead-
line has not yet passed. According to information from the THA the overwhelming majority
of investors has outstripped their targets. In roughly 1 000 cases, among them 150 "serious"
missings, the THA is in negotiations because the promised investments were not realized.
As it has been mentioned it is too simple to measure the performance of the THA by compar-
ing targets and their realization only. A meaningful performance indicator must take into ac-
count the manifold feedbacks between contract-shaping and contract-realization. In order to
do this, Kupper (1993) has calculated a series of indices: Chart 1 describes the dimensions,
indicators and variables measured in the test. Three dimensions inter alia - fulfilment of the
THA's main targets, limitation of the valuation risk and safeguard of contract clauses - have
been picked up. For each dimension the average value and the maximum value are compared.
The maximum value is assumed to be 1; the deviation of the calculated average values from I
can be interpreted as a measure for performance.
As Chart 2 shows the indices are in the range between 0.3 and 0.4. It is the highest in respect
to the limitation of the valuation risk and the lowest in respect to shaping the contracts. In all
cases the performance has improved remarkably over time: it has been much better in the pe-
riod up from summer 1992 than in the period before. The THA has steadily made progress in
negotiating, controlling and managing her contracts: particularly quality with respect to safe-
guard clauses could be increased considerably.
Unfortunately, no separate data for foreign investors are available. In principle, the THA
makes no difference between German investors and investors from abroad. But obviously she
has more difficulties with foreign investors than with German ones in pushing through curb-


































































Chart 2 - The THA's Performance in Reaching her Targets
0,6 -i-
• Contract concluded before 31.3.1991
H Contract concluded after 1.7.1992
0,57
Realization of the Targets
Source: Kiipper (1993).
Limitation of the Valuation
Risk
Safeguard of the Contract
Clauses
b) Adjustment and Revisions
The THA cannot force an investor to keep to the contract whatever the costs may be. She is,
in principle, ready to re-negotiate. In such a case an investor must bring arguments to bear.
One argument that normally counts is the existence of unclear contract clauses. Particularly in
the early stages of the privatization process the quality of the contracts left a great deal to be
desired. Then as a rule the THA agrees to re-negotiate in order to clarify the issue. But it is
rather pointless to try to wring the THA out of additional concessions.
The THA is very restrained with regard to investors who ask for re-negotiation because of fi-
nancial difficulties. She argues that her basic method to sell companies does not include risk
sharing with the purchaser. She is willing to pump a lot of money into the company before
selling it, but afterwards the purchaser has to run his company on his own. Nevertheless, even
on this point the THA is always open to discussion. In many cases the result will be that ad-
ditional support is granted - e.g. more time is given to pay the purchase price, to create the
promised jobs or to make the guaranteed investment volume.
Although the THA has focused her sales strategy on finding investors able to give the com-
pany a secure future, inevitably a great part of them fails. According to a new study about15
50 percent of the 25 000 companies.which were privatized by management-buy-out (MBO)
are facing severe financial troubles (Handelsblatt, 4th February, 1994). In.most cases the
business concept proved to be unable to carry the load. The new owners often miscalculated
their possibilities to run their company successfully. They overestimated the cash flow and,
accordingly, the net asset value of the company. Mostly, these difficulties have a strong cpn7
nection with the collapse of exports to the former RGW-countries. Initially, west German and
foreign investors expected to get rapid access to the eastern markets by purchasing a THA-
company but this strategy did not work out. Investors who failed their targets will hardly be
able to pay a penalty.
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Frequently, problems arise with proper calculation of the equity to be provided. The THA has
normally relieved companies of their debts by taking on old loans and has permitted special
items (equalization claims and liabilities) and special reserves to clear up the balance sheets.
This equity provided should be sufficient for the reorganization period of the company. In
fact, though, it has often proved to be too small.
Assessing the virtual demand for re-negotiation is very crude. According to estimates of a
THA-expert about 10 p.c. of all contracts are expected to be revised. But finally the share
might be somewhat higher. The majority of the privatized companies will be put to the test
only in the years to come.
c) Penalties
The THA puts special emphasize on clauses to safeguard contractually guaranteed invest-
ments and jobs. Experience has shown that by and large the penalties laid down in the con-
tracts for non-adherence by the investor are a valuable instrument to achieve the objective of
safeguarding. But their importance should not be overestimated. Penalties can work by the
same principle as traffic regulations: they should take care that the necessary steps are taken.
Only a minority breaks the regulations. By threat of punishment the THA hopes to hold the
number of offenders low.
Nevertheless, the THA feels rather unhappy with applying this instrument: until now she has
only taken 42 investors to court (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 8, 1994). Not to
forget that penalties cut both ways. "On the practical side it has become apparent that fixing
In the German legal literature there is a discussion whether a vital change in circumstances as-
sumed by the parties at the time the contract was concluded (Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage)
could be an argument for renegotiating the contracts. In this case a reduction of the purchase price
or the penalty is considered as recoverable, but not a repurchase by the THA (Wachter, 1994).16
the level of such penalties is rather like walking a tightrope: a balancing act between the eco-
nomic benefits to be gained thereby and the danger of frightening off potential investors"
(Bauragarten, 1992, p. 286). In fact, the typical THA contract with its specific safeguard
clauses shifts an incalculable risk onto the investor. An employment and investment guaranty
may easily become a time bomb. The THA cannot be interested in letting it go off.
Therefore, the THA hesitates to take a sledgehammer to crack a nut. She prefers other meas-
ures instead of imposing a fine. An adequate measure is to raise the purchase price subse-
quently. In fact two types of safeguard clauses are common: the penalty and the conditional
deferment of payment (see Annex 2 for typical contract clauses). From the legal point of view
raising the purchase price is easier to handle than enforcing a penalty (WSchter, 1994).
V Conclusions
The THA intends to close her shop at the end of 1994. Within 3 Vi years she has privatized or
liquidated more than 13 000 companies (a rate of approximately 10 per day) which is un-
doubtedly an impressive success story. Nevertheless, the THA has invested a lot of money for
getting her social goals realized. Time must tell whether the results make all these efforts
worthwhile.
The THA has undertaken her best to safeguard what she has reached in lengthy negotiations
with the investors. The typical acquisition contract is fully crammed with warranties. By and
large, the THA can be satisfied as the majority of investors has fulfilled or even exceeded
their obligations. A minority, however, has failed or will probably fail to do so. Some inves-
tors have shown themselves even as criminals who purchased a company only to plunder
it - the THA estimates her losses caused by shady businessmen in a range of some billion
DM. But, in fact, the one hundred dealers and wheelers are negligible in quantity. Much more
important are those some hundreds of well meaning investors who are in serious financial dif-
ficulties or even on the verge of bankruptcy. In these cases she has to exercise utmost caution
in pushing through her claims.
Could the THA-contracting procedure be a model which CPEs should emulate? The answer is
yes and no:
• The THA has been very successful in putting an investor on the chain. She does not only
pay lip services to them. Her contracts normally include specific investor's guarantees.
Although the clauses are legally simple, they have proved to be a useful means of exert-
ing pressure.17
• The THA, however, is not forced to maximize the revenues flowing into her coffers. She
is able to sugar the pill for the investor. It goes without saying that in this respect the
THA cannot be an example for governments in CPEs.
A possible way out of this dilemma may be a device of risk sharing between the seller and the
purchaser. A practised form of this is the "take-over" of a company by an investor in form of
a charge of administration (Geschaftsbesorgung). In that case the investor alone is responsible
for running the company but the state remains the legal owner while the investor holds an op-
tion for buying the company later on. What is most important: he has not taken on liability for
losses, e.g., to be due from overstaffing.18
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process and plain engineering
h> recycle organic and
inorganic waste materials
Raw materials, electric motors,
automatic control, where same
types usable in different areas








• - • 1Asse
Measures introduced
Focus of R & D on
industrial engineering
Investigation of price
advantage to be gained by
consolidating purchase of
materials
Capacities and equipment in production workshops to be concentrated and laid out logistically to
guarantee optimum work flow.
Vertical range of manufacture to be reduced as part of optimization process.
Standard times for machine work to be adjusted to those of the old lander (Lower Saxony).
Ministry of Metallurgy is





Can secure SU sales on
medium term through market
position and personal relations




Motivated and decisive management has enabled introduction of targeted and coherent business plai
person in the marketing of all products, particularly in countries with central economic reforms, ere:
show". Chief executive, who did not fulfil the requirements, replaced on 7.6.
isment
Evaluation
Expenditure 4.4% of turnover
vis-a-vis comparable firms e.g.
for 89/90. 4.2* of turnover
from tech. prod, sections.
Backlog
Moderate reductions in cost of
materials likely (up to 5%)
;
Value added is insufficient.
Time standards for assembly
work.
Time of high SU sales must be
better used to expand market
in former NSW countries
Production and central
sections: comb, business
sectors & depts, creation of
profit centres
a. The prominent role of one





















2. Cable & stranding machines





















































Orders for 1992 & 1993.
already on books
ensuring 80% & 70%
cap. util. from today
Hammer forge (part of
metallurgy) allocated
1991. Steel foundry, on
the other hand, to be
taken over to optimize
own capacity utilization.
All products involved in highly competitive markets. Strong position in Comecon area,
particularly Soviet Union, is being expanded and lucrative orders from this area used to
adapt technology for prod, groups 1.2 & oil machines to requirements of free
international markets.
Expanded marketing activity targeted on priority markets (EC, Iran. India, Far East), in
part with partners, in part alone.
Ersmalkn
Turnover for 1992 &
1993 very probable
Despite high level of
orders on hand from ..
east, activities targeted
to breaking into western
markets must be
accelerated












• social plan onjv.
Other expend.
(DM million)
* Dcprcc. for tax
* Social sec. costs
KiadKDMadfea)









Staffing Dbn (no. of emp)
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TDM per empi. per year achieved in mechanical
enajneermt to 1991.1»M 4 1993:170. KB and
232 reap.: in tnetaOaqry: 94.109 and 125.
Conditions/









1752 jobs cut U/90 through early retirement, normal
retirement & transitional payment ccheme. Hiving off
to be pursued & parMime A non-permanent staff to be
placement co.
Saka Offea win he met.





This will fully utilize polemic
for Ritionaliz. in the order of
period ftoml.3.91-21.12.92.
Extension of skiM-upgrading
win cost DM 20 million gross
Other expend, for same
turnover for 1991-93 quoted
DM 54.4 million lower in
comp. with May figures
Making use of potential for
rationalization from Job cuts &.
purchasing potential scheme will
bring positive result by 1993 at
latest
Per capita tales SMM 1992 -
113.9. 1993 127.8 b
unsatisfactory A must be
improved by rcdocinj cenoal
areas A hiving off pans.
Time & motion study needed in central area to cut jobs. Products from different business sections must undergo a value analysis, capacity examined in the light of
market opportunities & contribution margins determined. Transparency of costs is essential for establishment of profn centres/GmbHs.
Figure 4
Company number:
Result after depr. before interest
- interest




+1- A working capital
+/- other (cap. invest bonus)
disposals dur. period
netto cash flow
Profit and loss / cash flow



































































for job cuts are ambitious
Total net cash flow 1990-1993






















































costs in the sectors of materials and personnel, it is likely that net cash flow will

















Selling the GmbH as u whole is
difficult. Profit centres for
rolling mills, ind. eng. oil
machinery, metallurgy and
central functions have been
established. These may later
become legally independent
and be restructured and/or
privatized individually at a
faster rate.
No reprivatization claims. Up
to 1993 revenue from sale of
surplus plant and equipment
likely to be in region of
DM 5 + 8.5 + 8.5 million; this
has to be set against book values
totalling DM 41.9 million.
Parts of the 1.5 km
2 site are to





on Lake Barbel have been sold
for book value.
Assessment
Plan is in line with
objectives
Chances for privatization will be improved by the planned establishment of profit centres and/or
GmbHs, since the enterprise in its present structure cannot be privatized.
'•'
Source: Vogelsang (1992).22
Annex 2: Typical Safeguard Clauses in Acquisition Contracts
Conditionally granted partial payment delay
The purchase price amounts to 10 mill. DM. A minimum purchase price of 2.9 mill. DM has
to be paid within 10 days after notarial certification. The final payment of 7.1 mill. DM will
be deferred interest-free until December 31, 1997. The THA will waive the final payment al-
ready now, if the buyer invests 16 mill. DM into the business activities of the acquired com-
pany by June 30,1997.... Should the buyer invest less than 16 mill. DM, the THA waives the
final payment in the relation of the actual investments to 16 mill. DM.
Purchase Price Back-Payment/Increase
The parties agree that the purchase price was stipulated on the basis of the buyer's promise
that by privatization on the average 600 full-time jobs p.a. could be created or preserved in
the privatized company for the next three years. If this number is not reached or not com-
pletely, the buyer has to pay the seller, as an additional purchase price, 2 500 DM per full-
time employee and month of employment, by which this number has fallen below the stipu-
lated level in the average of the 36 months.
Contract Penalty
The buyer intends to invest 14 mill. DM into the company until June 30,1994, by acquisition
of investment goods listed in Annex ... or functionally comparable goods.... Provided these
investments are not carried through at all or not completely, the buyer has to pay the seller a
contract penalty amounting to.... p.c.
Open formulation
The buyer commits himself to employing at least 145 people on the annual average in the ac-
quired part of the company until December 31, 1996. If he violates this commitment, he is
obliged to pay the seller 25 000 DM per employee and year.
Source: WSchter, 1994.